tony.blair@sssshh.labour.org.uk - Updated

OK - I'm as keen to see the truth of this affair come out into the cold hard light of day as anyone. My first question however, is:

What makes this a secret "second" e-mail system, as opposed to secure VPN access to the Labour system, which any self-respecting Network Admin would want his users to benefit from? Having the ability to keep a client system clean of personal data, especially a shared system, is undeniably a 'good thing (tm)' from a network security standpoint. It doesn't imply that the system is a hidden alternate, or that records are not being kept.

Do we know for certain that this system is NOT the one Police would have had access to in their investigation(which would certainly put a different complexion on this)?

"but I did a WHOIS and it is owned by the Labour Party"

This may seem an odd observation, and perhaps shows my ignorance with regards to politics, but I have to wonder why the labour party has any such system in downing street.

Shouldn't such a system be owned by No. 10, and not the labour party.

I've updated the post to include the issues you both raised.

This is all very peculiar.

I would have thought that government communications systems are secure enough for routine use, so why the secondary system? There is also the point that these communications, like other government operations, are a matter of public record (even if they don't get released for 50 years or so) and so should not be going via external channels where they are outside the government archival process. What guarantee has been given that that this alternate channel meets government standards of security and integrity?

Finally, government should be separate from party - I don't see why government staff are using party political computer systems from their place of work, 10 Downing Street.

I note the top secret system is an Israeli one - thus presumably secure against everyone except the....

I remember reading recently that a similar sounding system for the US Congress was similarly an Israeli one.

But probably the Israelis don't need this system to twist Nu Labor's and Tony's arm. Lord Levy's son, I believe, is a senior civilian military planner in ... Israel.

It seems a bit pointless putting a secret e-mail system in Downing Street if Blair is only going to incriminate himself with a hand-written note.

johnf,

That's a good point. Robert Maxwell made stacks of cash selling the infamous Israeli security services system to various governments. It even dialed home with the data.

I know this is slightly off topic, but it could be a clue to why Blair is clinging to office with such tenacity. Its off an excellent American military intelligence site:

http://turcopolier.typepad.com/sic_semper_tyrannis/2007/01/situation_room_.html#comments

And is quoting a financial report to the Dutch Bank ING:

"Does SPR Increase Foretell Iran Strike?" Ashraf Laidi, Chief FX Analyst at CMC Markets NA

http://www.safehaven.com/article...rticle- 6764.htm

about the near certainty of an American/Israeli strike on Iran. The money quote is:

"the aggressive approach on beefing up SPR may reflect heightened possibility of a US military strike against Iran as early as March or April, at a time when US navy ships are piling up in the Persian Gulf. Yesterday, markets were filled with chatter of a Kuwait-based newspaper article reporting that the US will launch a military strike on Iran before April 2007, citing "reliable sources". According to the article, the strikes will be launched from US ships with Patriot missiles guarding all oil-producing countries in the region. The attacks would be planned in April, the last month of British PM Blair in office. The immediate result of such an attack is a protracted run up in oil prices, which could reach the $70 per barrel mark in less than a week."

I've commented before on Tony's desire to see us birthed into this new phase of the neo-con war. All that it will require is one British missile off one British warship and we will be at war.

Folks:

I think we're veering a little close to tinfoil helmet territory with elements of this.

This is a Labour Party system and not a government system because its for use by Labour Party employees to send emails relating to Labour Party business, not government business.

It's not housed at Downing Street - in fact so far as it appears it looks to be running on Whale Communications's own servers (which will be in the US) - and Downing only 'has' this system in the sense that it also 'has' access to Gmail and Hotmail, i.e. it has internet access and a browser.

It's not much of a secret when there's a publicly available case study on the supplier's website.

THe reference to 'israeli military grade security' means nothing more than it uses and uptodate implementation of RSA encryption with a pretty long key length (minimum 128 bit, probably a fair bit higher) which is nothing you couldn't achieve easily using an open source version of PGP.

And as for why the party felt the need for this kind of security, from speaking to someone inside the party (at a pretty junior level) who does have access to the systen - it is, after all, just a webmail system for Labour Party employees across the UK - one of its main uses was for event planning, particular arranging appearances by senior party figures at local campaign meetings in the run in to the election. By and large, the main 'argument' for having a system with level of security, as the vast majority of Labour Party employees understand it, is to ensure that the itineries of senior party figures are keep out of the public domain until the last minute, when they're out campaigning, for security reasons.

And I must say, what with the editor of News of the Screws going down last week for voicemail hacking, that's not an unreasonable argument.

Whether it might have been used for anything else, my colleague couldn't say, as they don't get those kinds of e-mails.

On thing to remember about Guido - he knows fuck all about technology.

Unity said:

...snip...

Then why lie about its existence?

Have we all lost the plot?

This is the government that wanted to introduce legislation requiring every Internet service provider to keep copies of every email sent for years. So what makes them different?

Well, buying a system which specifically includes the "provisions for wiping all traces of email attachments, files and user credentials" must look a little fishy to even the most diehard party supporter. The only possible reason for being able to wipe "all trace" from any email service is to prevent something becoming hard evidence at some future point.

If only they had had the system when it was "... a good day to bury bad news"

Looks like there are never enough good days in the calendar for Nu-Lab.

But what more should we expect from people that make decisions from bits of paper, quangos, committee meetings, presentations and workshops?

All they know is theory and ideology; they represent no-one other than their own business factions...

A form of tyranny really!

Yes indeed: What makes them different?

Screwing my techie head on here, Unity is right, there's nothing inherently fishy about this, it's a secure webmail service - the wiping of attachments etc. from client machines is perfectly sensible - if it routinely wiped email from the central server it would be rather dodgy and quite possibly illegal, but that hasn't been alleged let alone proven.

Indeed, it can be argued (SpyBlog often does, and he knows his onions) that using proper security and encryption is a profoundly sensible thing to do, which is why the real scandal is when Government and media try to portray anyone using it as a suspected criminal. This is like suggesting that anyone who ever put a letter in an envelope for some bizarre reason objects to it being read by anyone who finds it.]

There have been enough laughing at the MOD etc. for losing laptops with stuff on that we can't really laugh at a system designed to stop this happening. There's nothing wrong with using encryption, there's nothing wrong with lawful interception authorised by a court, there's a lot wrong with destroying evidence when the fuzz are onto you and there's a great deal wrong with demonising sensible security precautions, whether that comes from Number 10 or Guido.

No, what is meant by "military-grade" is that the system was developed FOR the Israeli military.

Whale Communications Ltd. was an ISRAELI company before being purchased by Microsoft.

Here's another interesting tidbit. An Israeli company was in charge of the video surveillance systems in the London Underground - a nice way to gain access to the underground if you want to execute a "false flag" "terrorist incident".

Here's another. In the US, for some time until they were discovered, an Israeli company was in charge of the US Federal law enforcement CALEA wiretapping system software. When members of the company were discovered passing wiretap information to drug dealers in Los Angeles, the FBI raised a fuss, and the CALEA system was reportedly shifted to another company.

According to Fox News (of all people!), the FBI and other agencies were seriously upset that Israeli personnel had access to Federal wiretapping systems.

Here's the bottom line: Israel is the source of much of the world's security technology. Their security technology industry is large and effective. Tjeu produce cryptography products, video surveillance products, telecommunications security products, physical security products, and much more.

It should be obvious to anyone that the best way to spy on the world is to be the world's supplier of security technology.

It's the sort of brilliant plan one expects from the Mossad.

Backdoors into security products? It's the sort of thing any half-decent state security apparatus does - why do you think 3DES was only just legalised in France? Conversely, if a security product is legal in the US/UK, what do you think the capabilities of the NSA/GCHQ/Mossad are with respect to it?

Israel has a highly sophisticated secret service, a defense doctrine based on low manpower and high technology (which doesn't work, as Hizbollah proved, but that's their lookout) and a thriving defence and hi-tech sector - it would be surprising if they didn't have plenty of marketable technology and an astonishing oversight if their spooks, the Yanks and indeed our own didn't have a pretty good idea of its capabilities and otherwise.

Anyway, the best ways into any security system are the human element - one of the all-time best at this is... the Mossad. Particularly if they write down incriminating notes on paper.