I Fought The Law and The Law Lost

FT: You have sent rather an inconsistent message. You have said to the SFO: ”Don’t investigate Saudi Arabia. Do investigate Tanzania and South Africa.”

Goldsmith: I haven’t said to the SFO: “Don’t investigate.” And I really think it’s about time if only in fairness to the SFO, never mind me, that the director of the SFO has said very, very clearly, and his assistant director said very clearly to the OECD [Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development] in Paris this week, that it was they who took the decision

You look strained. I know they have said the same thing to you because you have reported it. I didn’t pressure them. And I didn’t direct them. It was their decision. I have said on a couple of occasions now, precisely for the reasons you have given, that this is not entirely comfortable. I am confident it’s the right decision. I don’t mean in any sense it’s not the right decision. I believe it is and I will explain why.

But it’s uncomfortable precisely because some people are interpreting it, or might interpret it, as meaning we are going soft on our approach to tackling corruption. We are not...

... I want everyone to understand, particularly the business community, that nobody is above the law, BAE is not above the law.

... But I do not believe that when we signed up to the OECD convention we intended to abdicate all responsibility for our own national security. I can’t believe that we were agreeing to abandon any considerations of national security. That is, the lives of our citizens, ultimately putting them in jeopardy. And I don’t believe...

FT: You think lives were at risk?

Goldsmith: This is absolutely the position. Just let me finish, if you don’t mind, because I don’t believe that when we signed up to the OECD convention, article 5, we were agreeing to say considerations of national security don’t enter into this at all. Commercial considerations, ordinary diplomatic relations, fine, but not actual considerations of national security. I can’t believe any other member state did that either.

... The SFO accepted that they wouldn’t prosecute in relation to pre-2002 because that’s when we changed the law. They said they would need another 18 months to investigate. They were clear that there remained, as they put it, issues to determine. My judgement was there were obstacles they would not overcome.

FT: What were those obstacles?

Goldsmith: The principal obstacle, BAE were asserting that the payments they were making had been authorised at the highest level.

FT: The highest level of the Saudi monarchy?

Goldsmith: Yes, the Saudis. I am using that in a general sense ... [pauses] ... Normally to produce a corruption case you normally will call somebody senior from the company to say, “good heavens, I never knew the marketing director was taking used £50 notes, or getting a free subscription to the golf club, or having his roof done”, or whatever it may be. That’s the first person you call. How were the SFO going to deal with that in this case? Were they going to be able to call someone from Saudi to say this wasn’t authorised? That’s an insuperable problem.

... FT: Can we go back and trace through some of the details of this case. How were concerns expressed to the SFO?

Goldsmith: I haven’t got the precise chronology in my mind so I can’t quite do this at the moment. I did a perfectly proper exercise, which is called a Shawcross exercise, which was first done a year ago and which didn’t lead to the case being dropped. That wasn’t focusing on national security. Subsequently, it was clear from the prime minister and other senior ministers what the national security concerns were.

FT: Essentially that the Saudis would cut all intelligence cooperation and security co-operation? [Goldsmith nods] Did you see anything in writing saying that from the Saudis?

Goldsmith: Well, we would hardly expect to see it from the Saudis. It wasn’t communicated to me. It was communicated to the British government at the highest level.

FT: I am just trying to see how the government became aware of it. It doesn’t seem that senior members of the security services were aware of it.

Goldsmith: I don’t think that’s right, actually. Because, as I made very clear in my statement [on January 18], and SIS absolutely signed up to the statement I made about this, nobody disagreed. Everyone shared the concerns about the possible consequences, i.e. the value to national security and nobody disagreed that the Saudi threats were real.

The Saudi threats are not being made to the intelligence service. They are being made to the government. Really, you wouldn’t expect me to go into any more detail than that. That’s the reality of the situation.

It is a contradiction in terms to have an accountable office-holder who is not able to publish to those whom he is accountable the advice he has given. It is not enough for government ministers to say we are advised that it is lawful. Backbenchers, let alone the wider public, want to see for themselves what the arguments are.