Letter Requesting Judicial Review

What the letter before action says

  1. Oury Clark are acting for us pro bono representing named bereaved people, injured, survivors and relatives of survivors. List of names and how they were affected by 7/7 is attached.

  2. We, Oury Clark’s clients want an independent and public inquiry into the events surrounding the bombings

  3. The letter is a legal letter that precedes a Judicial Review. The previous Home Secretary refused our request. We don’t want to rush into litigation. We welcome the opportunity to discuss things. We don’t have fixed ideas about what an inquiry would involve. But we do want the truth to be seen to be told so lessons can be learned.

  4. The letter is to the Home Secretary. If there is legal action, she will be the defendant

  5. We are the Claimants – the people making the claim that there should be an inquiry

  6. Other interested parties include the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis, and Coroner. It is not known when he can have his inquest into the deaths caused by the bombs, because of court cases.

  7. We’re challenging the failure to hold an inquiry so far

  8. The facts – suicide bombings by Khan, Tanweer, Hussein and Lindsey. 2 bombers made suicide videos, 52 dead and many seriously injured on 7/705

  9. Various accounts by various authorities given after the bombings. Apparent inconsistencies and factual untruths in these accounts in information given to the public leads us to believe there may have been a breach of the duty to protect life. So an inquiry is necessary

  10. In July 2005, Clarke, the Home Secretary at the time said the bombers were ‘clean skins’ who ‘came out of the blue’. Since he said this, information has been revealed to the group/public that suggests that this is not the whole truth and is misleading or a deliberate lie. More on this in Appendix 1.

  11. One of the key troubling issues is whether there was any prior knowledge about the bombers (especially Khan and Tanweer) that ought to have alerted the authorities to arrest them/put them under surveillance. Information about this has emerged in a piecemeal way. The authorities ought to have known more about the bombers before and on 7 July 2005. We explain why in Appendix 1

  12. The ISC (Intelligence and Security Committee appointed by the PM to look into the work of the security services) said that the security services failed to take action against Khan and Tanweer because their focus was training in Pakistan, and fraud in the UK. This is challenged by information we’ve put into Appendix 1.

  13. The ISC report carefully states that the bombers were not ‘identified’as terrorist threats before 7 July. They should have been, and we enclose a M15 transcript of Khan talking to a known terrorist who was jailed for life recently and a list of disrecrepancies

  14. REASONS WHY AN INQUIRY IS NECESSARY – The Home Secretary has power to call an inquiry as a matter of public concern

  15. DUTY TO HAVE AN INQUIRY under the European Convention of Human Rights article 2 – State has positive duty to protect life.

  16. FAILURE BY THE STATE TO PROTECT LIFE. We have reason to believe the State has failed in this duty

  17. Of course, we don’t have access to all the information that the Government and its agencies has. We rely on reports from the ISC, the Government, the courts and the media

  18. Law about how the Government has a duty to protect individuals lives from the criminal acts of a 3rd party if they knew or ought to have known the risk, or could take measures to reduce it

  19. Legal argument

  20. If the Government were warned about 7/7 and could have taken steps to prevent it then they are in breach of the law ( article 2)

  21. If the State made a tactical decision not to arrest suspects in the hope that they would lead to other suspects, or because they were informants, then they are in breach of the law ( article 2).

  22. DUTY TO HOLD AN INQUIRY EVEN IF THERE HASN’T BEEN A BREACH OF THE LAW – courts undecided

  23. Common humanity and common sense should be applied when making decision about having an inquiry even if there’s been no breach of article 2

  24. Argument about needing to learn the lessons of history

  25. Public interest, public concern about lessons learned, public fears being allayed

  26. The known facts should therefore trigger an inquiry

  27. A reasonable Home Secretary should recognise need for an inquiry even if there hasn’t been an article 2 breach because accounts keep varying, which does not put minds at ease

  28. Inquiry should be independent, effective, open to a reasonable amount of public scrutiny and have survivors/next of kin involvement

  29. Nothing produced thus far meets this standard – the ISC Report, the Narrative, the London Assembly report

  30. Because none of them used material made available during the Crevice trial ( fertiliser bomb trial which revealed links between 7/7 bombers and another group of terrorists who were intercepted and jailed for life). The ISC report is now inconsistent with new evidence made available. The Narrative relies on the ISC report. This suggests the ISC did not see all the material they should have seen or did not appreciate its significance

  31. There are serious factual errors and inconsistencies in the ISC report and Narrative set out in appendix 2 which makes them ineffective.

  32. Coroner’s Inquest has been postponed

  33. And he can’t have an inquest for the foreseeable future

  34. In any case, a coroner’s inquest is not adequate and can’t cover all the issues.

  35. The Government have asked the ISC to re-examine the evidence, but they are not independent, they are appointed by the PM, they don’t have an independent investigator any more, no survivor or family can participate, we don’t know the ISC’s terms of reference, or how it will ensure the investigation is effective, there’s a conflict of interest because they have to defend why they missed things before, and they don’t have the power to compel witnesses/evidence. The Chair and Blair have even made statements saying they think the ISC will stand by its original report!

  36. THE GOVERNMENT’S CURRENT APPROACH – Reid’s 30 May 2007 response to our letter is quoted.

  37. Errors made in Reid’s letter

  38. Article 2 – does the case fall within it?

  39. Why Reid’s letter concerns us – material showing generalised security failures – no comfort to know there was no specific intelligence about an attack on 7/7.

  40. Troubling suggestion that inquiry can’t be carried out because of pressure on security services

  41. This seems to be an excuse not to have one at any time!

  42. This misses the point that we want an inquiry to help fight terrorism. Systemic failings need to be ironed out, bad practice tackled. Not doing this means the Government is not doing everything within our power to minimise the chance of anything similar happening again”( Reid’s letter).

  43. The argument about diverting resources is overstated and not supported by evidence

  44. Expert evidence from Anthony Glees and Crispin Black to back up our case

  45. Quote from Crispin Black

  46. ACTION THE GOVERNMENT MUST TAKE – an inquiry into the level of intelligence that there was a risk of an attack on or about 7/7/05, intelligence about the bombers, steps that could have been taken to apprehend the bombers or prevent the attacks, future recommendations, agree an inquiry is needed under Human rights legislation, timetable for an inquiry

  47. FURTHER DOCUMENTS – warnings of attacks

  48. And audio records of meetings between families, survivors and Government

  49. Expert evidence

  50. Contact details and proposed reply date