Al Qaeda in Iraq Gets a Bollocking From the Boss

Let's start with the good news. The surge is having an effect on the the small al Qaeda in Iraq (al QI). Relations between them and bin Laden have been tense for a long time. Zaquawi, the sadistic Jordanian, alienated many people by his cruelty, to the extent that frequent messages were sent to him by bin Laden and Zawahiri asking him to tone it down as he was losing support.

Faced with this, the tribal leaders started having second thoughts about tolerating the presence of these people. Something the US has skilfully exploited and has been quietly doing deals with the tribal leaders. Meanwhile, al QI are very much on the defensive. Their tactic of slaughtering the Shia to provoke a civil war is backfiring badly. Their calls for open revolt have, like every other call from al Q, fallen on deaf ears.

And now, another indignity; a very public telling off from the boss. The latest bin Laden tape doesn't focus on his grand visions or flights of fancy through world history but sticks to mundane matters, issues that a CEO normally never touches.

Mistakes were made, he admits referring to Zaquawi's 'kill the shia bastards' policy and makes a call for unity. This is a bit rich coming for someone who described the shia as one of the three enemies, but he also says that individuals should give way to group leadership and that people must be able to make concessions in order to find common ground. Also he stresses the need to bring tribal leaders into the fold.

Interesting. He was never close to the Jordanian and many were surprised when Zaquawi knelt before bin Laden's throne, something that he must be kicking himself for. But it is clear that they are in considerable disarray and their entire strategy has failed. The US is beginning to learn how to tackle terrorist groups and is making real progress in one key area, to separate the terrorist element from the local population, in this case a very heavily armed population.

This is good news but it has little to do with the insurgency. Most jihadists in Iraq are nationalist in their thinking and have political objectives such as removing corruption, changing political systems in their own countries. al Q is very different, seeking an almost messianic pan-national goal. This is also another division that is being understood and exploited.

Without al Qaeda, it may be possible, eventually, for the Sunni and Shia groups to work more closely and to work out common areas of understanding, policy and tactics. Pragmatism and nationalism may win the day. This may be partly what al Sadr is up to in his mysterious regrouping and there are signs that militia groups see the need to unite, but to unite without the apocalyptic sadists of al Qaeda in Iraq.

Will a man appear who can unite the Shia and Sunni? Well, Iraq is the homeland of Saladin and should a new Saladin arise with a message of pan-national unity that crosses religious divides, he would be a far greater challenge than any number of fragmented militias.