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The Downing St Memo: Who told the head of MI6 that "the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy"

Posted January 15th, 2006 by ringverse
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Do you remember the Downing St Memo?

The one that got leaked to the Times in the final week of the British General Election in 2005?
The one that got talked about here for a few days, but disappeared under the hoofs of the Bliar's 3rd election victory.
[Reproduced here]
Well, it played rather bigger in the states, and still does. Our ever vigilant opposition and media don't seem to have referred to it since here though.

One of the reasons that it was a bigger story in the US was Sir Richard Dearlove, then head of MI6 reported to the meeting that following his recent talks in Washington:

There was a perceptible shift in attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitable.
Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD.
But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy. The NSC had no patience with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime's record. There was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath after military action.

We never had any idea about the nature of Dearlove's meetings in Washington, and as far as I am aware [please correct me if I'm wrong] there wasn't too much digging into what his assumption that "the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy" was based on.

Well, fresh from having sat on the NSA wiretap story, the New York Times, it would appear, knew where Dearlove got his information. They just decided not to tell us this one either...

James Risen, a NYT reporter who eventually broke the NSA wiretap story has disclosed where he thinks Dearlove got his information in his book. Not as has been suggested from general gossip and tittle tattle, but from a personal briefing by George Tenet, and a series of meetings with the CIA. Reisen also contends that Dearlove was dispatched to Washington at Blair's request, to find out exactly what the definitive thinking was in Washington about Iraq and WMD.

This would suggest that Dearlove was reporting that "the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy." based on his meeting with George Tenet, then head of CIA.
If this doesn't merit further investigation by Her Majesty's Opposition and the Media here in the UK, then I don't know what does!

In Risen's own words:

"During the Saturday summmit, Tenet and Dearlove left the larger meeting and went off by themselves for about an hour and a half, according to a former senior CIA official who attended the summit. It is unclear what Tenet and Dearlove discussed during their one-on-one session. Yet Dearlove's overall assessment was reflected in the Downing Street Memo: the CIA chief and other CIA officials didn't believe that the WMD intelligence mattered, because war was coming one way or another.

" 'I doubt that Tenet would have said that Bush was fixing the intelligence,' said a former CIA official. 'But I think Dearlove was a very smart intelligence officer who could figure out what was going on. Plus, the MI6 station chief in Washington was in CIA headquarters all the time, with just about complete access to everything, and I am sure he was talking to a lot of people.' "

Was Sir Richard's assesment based on that briefing with George Tenet? If so, the whole case for war is exposed for the lie that it is. To say nothing about the spineless record of the New York Times...

While we are on the subject, it is worth remembering that in addition to Sir Richard Dearlove's contribution to the meeting...

The Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw said:

He would discuss this [the timing of military action] with Colin Powell this week. It seemed clear that Bush had made up his mind to take military action, even if the timing was not yet decided.
But the case was thin. Saddam was not threatening his neighbours, and his WMD capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran.
We should work up a plan for an ultimatum to Saddam to allow back in the UN weapons inspectors. This would also help with the legal justification for the use of force.

The Attorney General [Lord Goldsmith] said:

The Attorney-General said that the desire for regime change was not a legal base for military action. There were three possible legal bases: self-defence, humanitarian intervention, or UNSC authorisation. The first and second could not be the base in this case. Relying on UNSCR 1205 of three years ago would be difficult.

The Bliar himself said:

that it would make a big difference politically and legally if Saddam refused to allow in the UN inspectors. Regime change and WMD were linked in the sense that it was the regime that was producing the WMD. There were different strategies for dealing with Libya and Iran.
If the political context were right, people would support regime change.

And the Meeting in July 2002 concluded with:

(a) We should work on the assumption that the UK would take part in any military action. But we needed a fuller picture of US planning before we could take any firm decisions. CDS should tell the US military that we were considering a range of options.

(b) The Prime Minister would revert on the question of whether funds could be spent in preparation for this operation.

(c) CDS would send the Prime Minister full details of the proposed military campaign and possible UK contributions by the end of the week.

(d) The Foreign Secretary would send the Prime Minister the background on the UN inspectors, and discreetly work up the ultimatum to Saddam.

He would also send the Prime Minister advice on the positions of countries in the region especially Turkey, and of the key EU member states.

(e) John Scarlett would send the Prime Minister a full intelligence update.

(f) We must not ignore the legal issues: the Attorney-General would consider legal advice with FCO/MOD legal advisers.

Bliar.

Further reading:
Tom Paine
After Downing Street
Olson Online
t r u t h o u t